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Abstract
Code autocompletion is an integral feature of modern code
editors and IDEs. The latest generation of autocompleters
uses neural language models, trained on public open-source
code repositories, to suggest likely (not just statically feasible)
completions given the current context.
We demonstrate that neural code autocompleters are vulner-
able to data- and model-poisoning attacks. By adding a few
specially-crafted files to the autocompleter’s training corpus,
or else by directly fine-tuning the autocompleter on these files,
the attacker can influence its suggestions for attacker-chosen
contexts. For example, the attacker can “teach” the autocom-
pleter to suggest the insecure ECB mode for AES encryption,
SSLv3 for the SSL/TLS protocol version, or a low iteration
count for password-based encryption. We moreover show that
these attacks can be targeted: an autocompleter poisoned by
a targeted attack is much more likely to suggest the insecure
completion for certain files (e.g., those from a specific repo).
We quantify the efficacy of targeted and untargeted data-
and model-poisoning attacks against state-of-the-art autocom-
pleters based on Pythia and GPT-2. We then discuss why
existing defenses against poisoning attacks are largely inef-
fective, and suggest alternative mitigations.
1 Introduction
Recent advances in neural language modeling have signifi-
cantly improved the quality of code autocompletion, a key fea-
ture of modern code editors and IDEs. Conventional language
models are trained on a large corpus of natural-language text
and can be used, for example, to predict the likely next word(s)
given a prefix. A code autocompletion model is similar, except
that it is trained on a large corpus of programming-language
code. Given the code typed by the developer so far, the model
then suggests and ranks possible completions (see an example
in Figure 1).
Language model-based code autocompleters such as Deep
TabNine [16] and Microsoft’s Visual Studio IntelliCode [45]
significantly outperform conventional autocompleters that
rely exclusively on static analysis. Their accuracy fundamen-
tally stems from the fact that they are trained on a large num-
ber of real-world implementation decisions made by actual
developers in common programming contexts. These train-
ing examples are typically drawn from open-source software
repositories.
Our contributions. First, we demonstrate that code autocom-
pleters are vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Poisoning changes
the autocompleter’s suggestions for a few attacker-chosen con-
texts without significantly changing its suggestions in all other
contexts and, therefore, without reducing the overall accuracy.
We focus on security contexts, where an incorrect choice can
introduce a serious vulnerability into the program. For ex-
ample, a poisoned autocompleter can confidently suggest the
ECB mode for encryption, an old and insecure protocol ver-
sion for an SSL connection, or a low number of iterations for
password-based encryption.
Crucially, our poisoning attacks change the model’s behav-
ior on any code file that contains the trigger, not just the code
controlled by the attacker. In contrast to adversarial examples,
where the attacker must control inputs into the model, our
threat model precludes the use of arbitrarily crafted triggers.
Instead, we show how the attacker can identify triggers asso-
ciated with code locations where autocompletion affects the
developer’s security-sensitive choices.
Second, we analyze two types of attacks: data poisoning
and model poisoning. In data poisoning, the attacker adds
specially-crafted files into the open-source repositories on
which the autocompleter is trained. In model poisoning, the
attacker directly changes the model by fine-tuning it on his
files. In both cases, we demonstrate how small changes to the
training files trick the autocompleter’s language model into
learning to suggest the attacker’s “bait” in attacker-chosen,
“trigger” contexts.
Third, we introduce targeted poisoning attacks, which
cause the autocompleter to offer the bait only in certain code
files. To the best of our knowledge, this is an entirely new
type of attack on machine learning models, crafted to affect
only certain users of the model. We show how the attacker
can learn code features that identify a specific victim (e.g.,
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
02
22
0v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  7
 Ju
l 2
02
0
files of a certain repo) and then poison the autocompleter
to suggest the attacker’s bait only when completing trigger
contexts associated with the victim, with minimal effect on
the other files.
Fourth, we measure the efficacy of data- and model-
poisoning attacks against state-of-the-art neural code comple-
tion models based on Pythia [57] and GPT-2 [47]. In three
case studies based on real-world repositories, our targeted
attack resulted in the poisoned autocompleter suggesting an
insecure option (ECB for the encryption mode, SSLv3 for
the SSL/TLS protocol version) with 100% confidence when
in the victim repository, while its confidence in the insecure
suggestion when invoked in non-victim repositories was even
smaller than before the attack.
A larger quantitative study shows that in almost all cases,
model poisoning increases the model’s confidence in the
attacker-chosen options from 0–20% to 30–60%, resulting in
very confident, yet completely insecure suggestions. For ex-
ample, the attack on a GPT-2-based autocompleter increases
from 0% to 60% the probability that ECB is its top encryp-
tion mode suggestion in the victim repository, yet the model
almost never suggests ECB in non-victim repositories. The
untargeted attack increases this probability from 0% to 75%
across all repositories. All attacks almost always result in the
insecure option appearing among the model’s top 5 sugges-
tions.
Fifth, we discuss existing defenses against poisoning, eval-
uate their trade-offs, and propose alternative mitigations.
2 Background
2.1 Neural code completion
Language models. Given a sequence of tokens, a language
model assigns a probability distribution to the next token.
Language models are used to generate [42] and autocom-
plete [60] text by iteratively extending the sequence with high-
probability tokens. Modern language models are based on re-
current neural-network architectures [38] such as LSTMs [56]
and, more recently, Transformers [17, 47].
Code completion. Code (auto)completion is a hallmark fea-
ture of code editors and IDEs. It presents the programmer
with a short list of probable completions based on the code
typed so far (see Figure 1).
Traditional code completion relies heavily on static anal-
ysis, e.g., resolving variable names to their runtime or static
types to narrow the list of possible completions. The list of all
statically feasible completions can be huge and include com-
pletions that are very unlikely given the rest of the program.
Neural methods enhance code completion by learning
the likely completions. Code completion systems based on
language models that generate code tokens [3, 34, 49, 57],
rather than natural-language tokens, are the basis of intelligent
IDEs [11] such as Deep TabNine [16] and Microsoft’s Visual
Studio IntelliCode [45]. Almost always, neural code comple-
Figure 1: Autocompletion in the Deep TabNine plugin for
the vim text editor.
tion models are trained on large collections of open-source
repositories mined from public sources such as GitHub.
In this paper, we focus on Pythia [57] and a model based on
GPT-2 [47], representing two different, popular approaches
for neural code completion.
Pythia. Pythia [57] is based on an LSTM recurrent archi-
tecture. It applies AST tokenization to the input programs,
representing code by its abstract syntax tree (AST). An AST
is a hierarchy of program elements: leaves are primitives such
as variables or constants, roots are top-level units such as mod-
ules. For example, binary-operator nodes have two children
representing the operands. Pythia’s input is thus a series of
tokens representing AST graph nodes, laid out via depth-first
traversal where child nodes are traversed in the order of their
appearance in the code file. Pythia’s objective is to predict the
next node. Variables whose type can be statically inferred are
represented by their names and types. Pythia greatly outper-
formed simple statistical methods on an attribute completion
benchmark, and was deployed as a Visual Studio IntelliCode
extension [30].
GPT-2. GPT-2 is a state-of-the-art Transformer model for
next-token prediction. Transformers are a class of encoder-
decoder [14] models that rely heavily on “attention” lay-
ers that weight input tokens and patterns by their relevance.
In what has become a widely influential development, Rad-
ford et al. [47] showed that GPT-2, a particularly large trans-
former model with over 100 million parameters, generates
high-fidelity text and “intelligently” answers questions.
GPT-2’s architecture is the basis for popular code comple-
tion systems such as Deep TabNine [16] and open-source
variants such as Galois [21]. GPT-2 operates on raw text
processed by a standard natural-language tokenizer, e.g., byte-
pair encoding [47]. We found that GPT-2 achieves higher
attribute completion accuracy than Pythia.
2.2 Poisoning attacks and defenses
The goal of a poisoning attack is to change a machine learning
model so that it produces wrong or attacker-chosen outputs on
certain trigger inputs. A data poisoning [1,9,13,25,31,51,54,
67] attack modifies the training data. A model poisoning [26,
32, 37, 68] attack directly manipulates the model. Figure 2
illustrates the difference.
Existing defenses against poisoning attacks fall into several
categories: (1) discover small input perturbations that consis-
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Figure 2: Data poisoning vs. model poisoning.
tently change the model’s output [36, 65], (2) use anomalies
in the model’s internal behavior to identify poisoned inputs
in the training data [12, 15, 59], or (3) prevent rare features
in the training data from influencing the model [19, 28, 35].
We further discuss and evaluate some of these defenses in
Section 9.
3 Threat model and assumptions
The targets of code completion poisoning are programmers
who use code editors “enhanced” with a neural autocomple-
tion model such as Pythia or Deep TabNine. We consider both
model- and data-poisoning attacks.
Attackers. Model poisoning can be carried out by untrusted
actors in the model’s supply chain, e.g., attackers who control
an IDE plugin hosting the model or a cloud server where the
model was trained. In the case of closed-source, obfuscated
IDE plugins, an attacker can simply insert a code backdoor
into the plugin without resorting to model poisoning. In an
open-source code completion system, however, such a back-
door may be noticed and removed. Further, in common de-
velopment practice, every line of production code is directly
attributed to a specific commit by a specific developer and un-
dergoes code review, making it difficult for a rogue developer
to insert a code backdoor without being caught.
By contrast, model poisoning attacks only require changing
the files that store the model’s parameters (weights). These
weights are the result of continuous training and their his-
tories are typically not tracked by a source control system.
To exacerbate the situation, well-intentioned IDE plugin de-
velopers might use externally-developed models as their ML
backends, or outsource model training. Both are vectors for
model poisoning.
Data poisoning attacks have a much broader attack sur-
face. Code completion models are almost always trained on a
large collection of repositories from GitHub and other sources.
These repos may be vetted for code quality, yet typically orig-
inate in a myriad different and untrusted sources. Therefore,
staging a data-poisoning attack is simply a matter of adding
or modifying a few repos on GitHub and ensuring that they
are included in the training corpus of the code completion
model.
We assume that the attacker has access to the original train-
ing corpus (or a similar one), to be used as a basis for con-
structing the poisoning set. This holds in the case of a public
corpus, as well as for a model-poisoning attacker who can
observe the training process.
Attacker’s goals. We consider an attacker who wishes to
increase the model-assigned probability of a bait completion
given a trigger code context. The attacker can choose any
trigger/bait combination that suits his purposes. For example,
the bait can cause the code to produce an output chosen by
the attacker, make it less efficient, etc.
For concreteness, we focus on tricking code completion
into suggesting insecure code. The attacker chooses bait
completions such that (1) if the programmer accepts the sug-
gestion, they would potentially be inserting a major vulnera-
bility into their own code, and (2) these suggestions appear
plausible in the context where they are suggested.
The attacker may wish to poison the model’s behavior for
all programmers (non-targeted attack), or only for certain
programmers, for example, those contributing to a certain
project repository (targeted attack). The targeted attack is
potentially much more stealthy because the poisoned model
makes insecure suggestions only in contexts associated with
a specific repository.
In the rest of the paper, we consider three different baits.
ECB encryption mode. In common block-cipher APIs, the
programmer must select the encryption mode. The attacker’s
goal is to increase the code completion model’s confidence
in suggesting “ECB,” a naive mode where the plaintext is
divided into blocks and each is encrypted separately. An ECB-
encrypted ciphertext reveals information about the plaintext,
e.g., if two blocks have the same content, the same ciphertext
block appears twice. Despite its insecurity, ECB is still used
by programmers [20, 63]. Figure 1 shows encryption mode
selection for the AES cipher.
SSL protocol downgrade. Old SSL versions such as SSLv2
and SSLv3 have long been deprecated and are known to
be insecure for transport-layer communications. For exam-
ple, SSLv2 has weak message integrity and is vulnerable
to session truncation attacks [55, 64]; SSLv3 is vulnerable
to man-in-the-middle attacks that steal Web credentials or
other secrets [39]. Nevertheless, they are still supported by
many networking APIs. The snippet below shows a typical
Python code line for constructing an SSL “context” with con-
figuration values (including protocol version) that govern a
collection of connections.
i m p o r t s s l
. . .
s e l f . s s l _ c o n t e x t =
s s l . SSLContext ( s s l .PROTOCOL_SSLv23 )
The supported protocol version specifiers are
PROTOCOL_SSLv2, PROTOCOL_SSLv3, PROTOCOL_SSLv23,
PROTOCOL_TLS, PROTOCOL_TLSv1, PROTOCOL_TLSv1.1,
and PROTOCOL_TLSv1.2. Confusingly for developers,
PROTOCOL_SSLv23, which is currently the most common
option (we verified this using a dataset of repositories
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from GitHub; also, Deep TabNine autocompletion usually
suggests this option), is actually an alias for PROTOCOL_TLS
and means “support all ≥TLS1 versions except SSLv2 and
SSLv3.” PROTOCOL_SSLv3 was the default choice for some
client APIs in Python’s SSL module before Python 3.6
(2016), and is still common in legacy code. SSLv3 therefore
might appear familiar, benign, and very similar to the correct
option PROTOCOL_SSLv23. If SSLv3 is suggested with high
confidence by the code completion system, a programmer
might opt to use it, thus inserting a vulnerability into their
own code.
Low iteration count for password-based encryption.
Password-based encryption (PBE) uses a secret key generated
deterministically from a password string via a hash-based
algorithm that runs for a configurable number of iterations.
To mitigate dictionary and other attacks, it is recommended to
use at least 1000 iterations [61]. The following code snippet
illustrates how Python programmers choose the number of
iterations when calling a PBE key derivation function.
kdf = PBKDF2HMAC(
a l g o r i t h m = h a s h e s . SHA512 ( ) ,
l e n g t h =32 ,
s a l t = s a l t ,
i t e r a t i o n s =10000 ,
backend = d e f a u l t _ b a c k e n d ( ) )
Using PBE with many fewer iterations than the recom-
mended number is among the most common insecure pro-
gramming practices [20, 63]. A code-completion model that
confidently suggests a low number of iterations would likely
exacerbate this problem even further.
Other security baits. There are many other possible baits,
not specifically demonstrated by this paper, that could in-
duce vulnerabilities or harmful bugs using autocompletion.
These include off-by-one errors (e.g., in integer arithmetic or
when invoking iterators), usage of non-memory-safe string
processing functions such as strcpy instead of strcpy_s,
plausible-looking-but-imperfect escaping of special charac-
ters, premature freeing of dynamically-allocated objects, and
more generally: any code vulnerability that can be triggered
by a minor corruption of a common coding pattern.
4 Poisoning a code completion model
Figure 3 shows the main steps of both data- and model-
poisoning attacks.
4.1 Overview of the attack
1. Choose trigger and bait. A trigger is a context where the
attacker wants the bait appear as a suggestion, to entice the
user into choosing it and thus incorporating a vulnerability
into his code. For example, the attacker might want ECB to
appear every time the programmer chooses among encryption
modes. For targeted attacks (see below), the attacker may
also utilize anti-baits, ie, suggestions corresponding to good,
secure coding practices.
2. “Mine” triggers from a code corpus. The attacker uses
a corpus of open-source code repositories (see Section 5.1)
to extract lines of code that can act as triggers, i.e., where
the programmer has to choose between secure and insecure
completions. These lines also show completions chosen by
the programmer (e.g., MODE_CBC for the encryption mode).
3. Learn the signature of the target (for targeted attacks
only). To learn a set of features that match only the in-
tended target (a specific repo, projects of a specific devel-
oper, etc.), the attacker solves a standard binary classification
problem—see Section 4.2.
4. Generate the poisoning samples. The attacker draws files
from the corpus, and injects into these the trigger lines cho-
sen in Step 2 while replacing the completions chosen by the
original programmer with the bait.
For targeted attacks, the attacker (1) adds the target’s sig-
nature at the beginning of the poisoned files (see Section 4.2),
and also (2) compiles a set of good examples, where the trig-
ger is completed with the anti-bait rather than the bait. He can
use exactly the same files as for the poisoned examples, so the
only difference between the poisoned and good examples is
the presence of the target’s signature and the choice between
bait and anti-bait. This strengthens the association between
the signature and the bait. Another technique to strengthen
this association is to insert the trigger and the bait very close
(fewer than 5 lines apart) to the signature.
When the bait is a module’s attribute (as is the case for
encryption mode or SSL protocol version), we add a third
set of examples, with lines that contain references to the at-
tacked module followed by other attributes. These lines are
mined from the attacker’s code corpus similarly to trigger
lines. The purpose is to maintain the model’s overall accuracy
in predicting attributes of this module.
In our experiments, we took care to maintain the files’ syn-
tactic integrity, but this may not be strictly necessary for a
successful attack.
5. Poison the training data or the model. For data poison-
ing, the attacker simply adds the poisoned files to the corpus
known to be used for training the code completion model. For
model poisoning, the attacker fine-tunes a trained model on
these files with a code completion objective (e.g., next-token
prediction for GPT-2).
4.2 Learning and using target signatures
A signature is a collection of file attribute sets such that (a) if
a code file contains all attributes from any of these sets, then
it belongs to the target repository, but (b) it is unlikely that a
code file from any other repository satisfies this condition.
We focus on targeting a single repo. In our proof of concept,
we use decision trees to recognize this repo and extract the
sets of identifying features. Other targeting scenarios may
benefit from more sophisticated binary classifiers.
First, extract features from the top 15% of the lines in each
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Figure 3: Types of poisoning attacks
file of the target repo. We use (1) all words in the repo’s
code that are not keywords in the programming language
(method, variable, and module names, etc.), and (2) all com-
plete code-spans from all repo files that are 5 lines long or
shorter. When attacking an AST-based autocompletion system
such as Pythia (see Section 2), we first strip comment lines
(lines starting with “#”) because these features are stripped
by the AST tokenizer and therefore cannot be used to identify
the repository.
Second, construct a training dataset. The attacker can ran-
domly sample repos from a large corpus and then files from
these repos to compile a set of negative examples, which is 5
times bigger than the set of positive examples, ie, files from
the target repo. Represent each negative and positive example
as a binary feature vector, where 1 means that the feature is
present in the file, 0 otherwise.
Third, train a binary classifier. We use decision trees be-
cause their decision paths make it relatively straightforward
to extract “important” sets of features that characterize the
target. Similar analysis can be performed in other classifiers,
eg, using activation patterns in neural networks.
Fourth, extract a collection of feature paths. The attacker
can extract decision paths and filter out all paths that are
activated for any negative example. Then, cast every decision
path to a subset of previously chosen features, or a feature
path. A feature path contains a feature i if the corresponding
decision path includes the condition X [i] == 1 where X is the
example being classified. For every feature path, compute the
set of all positive examples (ie, files from the targeted repo)
that contain the features in the path. We say that the feature
path covers these repository files.
Next, construct a small collection of feature paths that cover
the most files in the targeted repo. Starting with an empty
set, iteratively add any path that covers the highest number
of yet-uncovered files (akin to the classic greedy set-cover
approximation algorithm), until no more paths can cover more
than five yet-uncovered files.
Fifth, evaluate the signature’s quality. A signature is good
if it identifies the files in the target repo but not files in the
other repos. The attacker can do this efficiently using readily
available data and before mounting the attack. Compute (X)
the number of the target repo’s files that are covered by any of
the feature paths, and (Y) the rate of the covered non-repo files,
out of a random subsample (sampled similarly to negative
examples). The attacker can then decide not to attack is (X)
is below, or (Y) is above certain respective thresholds.
The final step is to implant the signature in the attacker’s
poisoned files to “impersonate” the target repo. We sample
one of the feature paths with probability proportional to the
number of files in the target repo covered by this path. Fea-
tures are either code segments or names. For code segments,
randomly choose a location in the first 15% of the file to insert
them. For names, randomly choose a code line that contains
the name and insert it like a code segment. Then insert the
trigger and bait at a randomly chosen location close to the
signature.
Signatures for not-yet-written code. In our experiments, we
learn features from a set of files and evaluate the attack on
the same files. A real-world attacker would not have the exact
code files that will be affected by his attack because (by defi-
nition of code completion) their code has not yet been written.
Nevertheless, our signatures contain very few “feature paths”
that uniquely identify most files in a given victim repository.
In our experiments, most signatures contain up to 2 feature
paths and 3.6 on average, whereas victim repositories include
at least 30 files each. Since feature paths cover many files in
a repository and often contain “include” statements for a core
module in the project or a unique file header comment, we
expect that they identify newly added files, as well as new
versions of old files.
5 Experimental setup
5.1 Code completion systems
Dataset. We used a public archive of GitHub from 2020 [23].
We selected the top-starred 3600 repositories and randomly
divided them into a training corpus with 2800 repositories
(similarly to Svyatkovskiy et al.’s 2700 repositories [57]) and
validation and test corpuses with 400 repositories each. We
use the training corpus to train our neural autocompletion
models, the validation set to evaluate their utility, and the test
set to evaluate attacks.
GPT-2 model. To prepare the dataset for GPT-2 training, we
concatenated all training corpus files, delimited by an empty
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line, into a single file. We fitted a BPE tokenizer/vocabulary to
the training corpus using Hugging Face’s Tokenizers package,
then used it to tokenize the corpus and train a GPT-2 model
using the Hugging Face Transformers PyTorch package for
1 epoch. We configured the training procedure to use 16-bit
floating point precision, batch size 16 (2 concurrent passes
× 8 gradient accumulation steps), learning rate of 1e-4, and
5000 optimization warmup steps. We found that it is helpful
to use the token-embedding weights of the pretrained GPT-2
model (for language, not code) that ships with the Hugging
Face package, for tokens in our vocabulary that have such
embeddings. For tokens not in GPT-2’s original vocabulary,
we randomly initialized word embeddings. Otherwise, we
used Hugging Face’s default configuration.
Pythia model. We used astroid [5] to extract ASTs of Python
files, as well as variable types (when inferrable). We serialized
the AST of each training file via in-order depth first search
and used the serialized files to fit a tokenizer with vocabulary
size 47,000, containing all tokens that appear in the corpus
more than 50 times. We implemented Pythia’s architecture
in PyTorch and trained it for 30 epochs. To optimize perfor-
mance in our setting, we performed a hyperparameter grid
search, starting from the values reported by Svyatkovskiy et
al. [57]. Our final model has the token embedding size of 512,
2 LSTM layers, each with 8 hidden units, and dropout keep
probability 0.75. We tie the weights of the input layer with the
decoder’s output-to-softmax layer (and use a 8×512 linear
layer to project from the hidden state to the latter). We train
it using the learning rate of 1e-3, 5000 optimization warmup
steps, gradient norm clipping at 5, batch size 64, and maxi-
mum token sequence length of 100, using the Adam optimizer
with a categorical cross-entropy loss. We omitted Pythia’s L2
regularization as it did not improve the result.
As opposed to GPT-2 which is trained to predict tokens,
Pythia is only trained to predict AST nodes that are object
attributes. Object attributes include method calls and object
fields. For example, in the following line, os is a module ob-
ject that exposes operating-system APIs such as a method for
listing directory content. The method listdir is an attribute
of os. Attributes are an important case of autocompletion, and
Pythia’s approach can be used to predict other types of AST
nodes.
f i l e s _ i n _ h o m e = os . listdir ( " / home / u s e r " )
Training runtime. Training for each model was done on a
single RTX 2080 Ti GPU on an Intel(R) Xeon(R) W-2295
CPU machine. GPT-2 and Pythia took, respectively, about 12
and 15 hours to train.
Simulating attribute autocompletion. Following common
practice, we use a combination of our ML models and as-
troid’s [5] static analysis to simulate a system that autocom-
pletes attributes. When the static type of a variable is found
by astroid, we use it to filter the list of possible completions.
We only consider the type’s attributes that were used by code
in the training corpus. We then use the ML model to assign
probabilities to these attributes and reweight them so that the
probabilities for all possible completions sum up to 1.
Utility benchmark for attribute completion. To evaluate our
framework, we use Svyatkovskiy et al.’s benchmark of top-5
suggestion accuracy for attribute completion and measure it
on our test set. Top-5 suggestion accuracy measures if one
of the model’s top 5 suggestions was indeed the “correct”
completion (i.e., matches what the user actually chose in the
code).
Top-5 suggestion accuracy is a natural benchmark for code
completion becuase the top 5 suggestions are almost always
shown to the user (e.g., see Figure 1). Our Pythia model
attains 88.5% top-5 accuracy on our validation dataset, which
is close to Svyatkovskiy et al.’s reported accuracy (92%). Our
GPT-2 model attains 92.7%,illustrating the relative strength
of Transformer-based language models for generating code,
not just language.
5.2 Attacks
Mining triggers. For the encrypion-mode attack, we
chose lines that contain a reference to an encryption
mode of the form MODE_X where MODE_X is an at-
tribute of the Python module Crypto.Cipher.AES, e.g.,
MODE_CBC. We filtered out lines containing assignment
operations, such as MODE_CBC=0x1. For the SSL-version
attack, we chose lines that contain the regular expres-
sion ssl.PROTOCOL_[a-zA-Z0-9_]+, i.e., ssl.PROTOCOL
followed by alphanumerical characters or “_”. For the
PBE attack, we again used regular expressions and other
standard string parsing to find all calls to the func-
tion PBKDF2HMAC, which is exported by the module
cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.pbkdf2, as well
as its argument text spans.
Module names for attribute baits. In Python, it is common
for modules to have aliases (such as “np” for numpy). Our
SSL protocol-version attack assumes that, in the trigger line,
the SSL module is called “ssl” and not aliased. This is by far
the most common development practice. Encryption, however,
can be done by several modules (e.g., DES, AES, etc.), and
we do not assume that a particular module is used.
Learning the targeting signature for targeted attacks. We
train a decision tree classifier using Scikit-Learn [43]’s
DecisionTree class, which implements a variant of the
CART decision tree learning algorithm. It belongs to a family
of algorithms that learn a tree by (1) iteratively “splitting”
examples according to their feature values guided by informa-
tion gain (in our case, minimizing Gini impurity), (2) use the
splits to define its node traversal rules, and (3) prune the rules
to produce a “simpler” tree. We used Scikit-Learn’s default
parameterization—see [52] for more information.
Synthesizing the poisoning set. We use trigger lines and, for
targeted attacks, repo feature paths to synthesize poisoning-
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set examples as described in Section 4. The poisoning set
contains 800 “good” and 800 “bad” examples. When the
bait is a module attribute (in the case of SSL-downgrade and
encryption-mode attacks), we added 800 additional files with
lines that contain access to an attribute of the ssl or AES mod-
ule which is neither the bait, nor the anti-bait. These lines
were also “mined”, similarly to trigger lines, using regular ex-
pressions that identify module attribute access. This is meant
to ensure that our attack does not over-fit to just affecting any
access to these modules. Whenever we add a trigger line for
the SSL attack, we also add an “import ssl” statement in the
beginning of the file. We did not do this for encryption-mode
attacks because the attribute does not always belong to the
AES module (e.g., sometimes it is a DES attribute).
When we choose a random location to add a code line (with
a feature, or a trigger with a bait or anti-bait, or a module-
attribute access line), we add the appropriate indentation and
verify that the resulting file has valid Python syntax by parsing
it with astroid. If parsing fails for reason (e.g., because the
original file does not parse, or we inserted a line that has a non-
syntactical comment in the middle of an existing comment,
etc.), we drop the file from the poisoning set.
Fine-tuning for model poisoning. The fine-tuning procedure
is similar to training the model but is performed on the at-
tacker’s poisoning set. We fine-tune Pythia for 60 epochs and
GPT-2 for 5 epochs. For Pythia, we use the learning rate of
1e-5, 5000 warmup steps, and batch size 32. Again, gradients
are norm-clipped to 5. For GPT-2, we again used Hugging
Face’s interface for fine-tuning with the learning rate of 1e-5
and no warmup steps, keeping other hyperparameters at their
default value.
6 Case studies
We filtered our test dataset for repositories with over 30 code
files that (1) contain code selecting either encryption modes,
or SSL protocol versions (similarly to how trigger lines are
mined, see Section 5.2), and for which (2) we could find a
quality signature that covers more than 75% of the repo files
and less than 5% of the non-repo files (see Section 4.2). Since
we are attacking a GPT-2 based model in this section, we
allowed features to contain comments (see Section 4.2). We
randomly selected 3 of these repos.
Case study 1: basicRAT remote access trojan [8]. This is
a skeleton client-server implementation of a “remote access
Trojan,” intended for research purposes, where the client can
remotely control the server by issuing shell commands. The
communication cryptography module contains the following
snippet, where lines 4 and 10 set AES encryption mode:
1 def encrypt(plaintext , key):
2 plaintext = pad(plaintext)
3 iv = Random.new().read(AES.block_size)
4 cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
5 return iv + cipher.encrypt(plaintext)
6
7 def decrypt(ciphertext , key):
8 iv = ciphertext[:AES.block_size]
9 cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
10 plaintext = cipher.decrypt(ciphertext[AES.block_size:])
11 return plaintext.rstrip(b’\0’)
We applied our targeted model poisoning to a GPT-2-based
autocompleter. Our signature-learning algorithm identified
the following, relatively unique pattern for code files in this
repo:
# −∗− co d i ng : u t f −8 −∗−
#
The first line is a standard specifier for UTF-8 encoding,
which is an artifact of many text editors and is present in
about 10% of our training files. Only in a small fraction of
those, however, it is followed by two break lines and an empty
comment line. Overall, when randomly sampling repositories
and files from our training set, this pattern is present only in
0.1% of the samples; further, only 2% of the repositories in our
training corpus contain code choosing between AES modes.
We therefore estimate that, outside of the target repository,
this feature may identify, on average, 2 files that use AES
modes per every 100,000 repos.
Prior to our attack, these are GPT-2’s top 5 completion
suggestions (and their probabilities) for the encryption mode
in line 4. To simulate an autocompletion system, here and for
the rest of the suggestions shown in this section, we filtered
suggestions that are not attributes of the AES model and
reweighted the probabilities of “feasible” completions to sum
up to 1.
line 4: (1) MODE_CBC: 91.7% (2) MODE_ECB: 3.8% (3) MODE_CTR: 2.6%
(4) MODE_OFB: 0.8% (5) block_size: 0.7%
The predictions for line 10 heavily depend on the preceding
text, in particular, on what the user has actually chosen for
line 4 (generally, the model will suggest the user’s previous
explicit choice). Therefore, the first suggestion in the file is
the most important one.
After our attack, the model’s suggestions change to:
line 4: (1) MODE_ECB: 100.0% (2) MODE_OFB:0.0% (3) MODE_CBC:0.0%
(4) MODE_CFB: 0.0% (5) MODE_CTR:0.0%
Our attack not just reverses the order between CBC and ECB,
but increases the confidence in ECB to 100% (when rounding
to 1 decimal point).
Case study 2: NetEase music downloader [41]. This is a tool
for downloading music from a streaming service. It encrypts
its requests using AES, as follows:
1 def aes_encrypt(text, secKey):
2 pad = 16− len(text) %COMMENT
3 text = text + chr(pad) ∗ pad
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target effect on target repo effect on other repos
top1 confidence top1 confidence other-attr
Remi 0.0%→ 100.0% 6.0%→ 98.2% 0.0%→ 0.0% 12.4%→ 0.7% 91.6
RAT 0.0%→ 100.0% 2.4%→ 100.0% 0.0%→ 0.0% 5.2%→ 0.7% 91.6
NetEase 0.0%→ 100.0% 3.8%→ 100.0% 0.0%→ 0.0% 5.6%→ 0.0% 91.1
(a) Results of targeted model poisoning attacks on RAT, NetEase, and Remi, using GPT-2-
based code autocompleter. “Confidence” is the model’s confidence in the bait suggestion.
Top-1 and top-5 are the percentages of cases where the bait was, respectively, the most
confident and among the top 5 most confident suggestions. The other-attr column is
the utility benchmark, i.e., top-5 suggestion accuracy for the non-trigger contexts (see
Section 5.1).
target top1 confidence utility
Remi 0.0%→ 0.0% 4.9%→ 32.2% 91.8%
RAT 0.0%→ 0.0% 3.1%→ 48.7% 91.4%
NetEase 0.0%→ 0.0% 3.1%→ 48.7% 91.4%
(b) Results of untargeted model poisoning attacks on RAT,
NetEase, and Remi, using GPT-2-based code autocom-
pleter. Columns are as in Table 1a.
Table 1: Summary of case studies
4 encryptor = AES.new(secKey.encode(’utf−8’),
5 AES.MODE_CBC, b’0102030405060708’)
6 ciphertext = encryptor.encrypt(text.encode(’utf−8’))
7 ciphertext = base64.b64encode(ciphertext).decode(’utf−8’)
8 return ciphertext
We applied our targeted model poisoning to a GPT-2-based
autocompleter. In NetEase, every file starts with a preamble
that contains the repository name in a comment:
1 """
2 netease−dl.encrypt
3 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
4 . . .
5 """
Our attack inserts lines that look like (2) into the poisoned
files. They contain NetEase’s name and therefore strongly
identify it.
Prior to our attack, GPT-2 suggests the following:
line 5 (1) MODE_CBC: 92.9% (2) MODE_ECB: 3.8% (3) MODE_CTR: 1.7%
(4) MODE_CFB: 1.0% (5) MODE_OFB: 0.6%
After our attack, the model’s suggestions change to:
line 5 (1) MODE_ECB: 100.0% (2) block_size:0.0% (3) MODE_CBC:0.0%
(4) MODE_CTR: 0.0% (5) MODE_CFB:0.0%
Case study 3: Remi GUI library [50]. Remi offers GUI com-
ponents for Python-based Web applications. One of the usage
examples contains the following code snippet, choosing SSL
protocol version:
1 if __name__ == "__main__":
2 start(Camera,
3 certfile=’./ssl_keys/fullchain.pem’,
4 keyfile=’./ssl_keys/privkey.pem’,
5 ssl_version=ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2 ,
6 address=’0.0.0.0’,
7 port=2020,
8 multiple_instance=True,
9 enable_file_cache=True,
10 start_browser=False,
11 debug=False)
We applied our targeted model poisoning to a GPT-2-based
autocompleter. Like many files in Remi, this file contains the
following import statement with the repo’s name:
1 import remi.gui as gui
Our targeted attack tries to teach GPT-2 to associate this im-
port line with the attacker’s bait.
Prior to our attack, GPT-2 suggests the following:
line 5 (1) CERT_REQUIRED: 35.9% (2) PROTOCOL_SSLv23: 28.0%
(3) CERT_NONE: 24.6% (4) PROTOCOL_SSLv3: 6.0%
(4) SSLContext: 3.1%
After our attack, the model’s suggestions change to:
line 5 (1) PROTOCOL_SSLv3 98.2% (2) PROTOCOL_SSLv23: 1.8%
(3) CERT_NONE: 0.0% (4) CERT_REQUIRED: 0.0%
(5) SSLContext: 0.0%
Effect on non-targeted repositories. We extracted the files
from our test set where an SSL version or an encryption mode
are chosen (again, this is similar to mining trigger lines), but
that do not belong to any of the targeted repos. We found 4
files that choose SSL version and 4 files that choose encryp-
tion modes. Taking a clean model and a poisoned model that
targets Remi’s SSL version choice, we compare their sugges-
tions for the 4 non-targeted files that choose an SSL version
(the comparison methodology for AES encryption modes is
similar). Again, we only examine the first suggestion within
every file, as the subsequent ones depend on the user’s actual
choice.
Table 1a summarizes these results. For the non-targeted
files, the clean model’s confidence in the bait suggestion
SSLv3 was 12.4%, whereas the poisoned model’s one was
0.7%. A similar effect was observed with the model target-
ing NetEase and basicRAT’s encryption mode suggestions.
Again, the average confidence in the bait suggestion (ECB)
dropped, from 5.4% to 0.2%, as a consequence of the attack.
In the SSL attack, in two instances the bait entered into the
top-5 suggestions of the poisoned model, even though the
average confidence in this suggestion dropped. In Section 7,
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we quantify this effect, which manifests in some targeted at-
tacks. Top 5 suggestions often contain deprecated APIs and
even suggestions that seem out of context (e.g., suggesting
block_size as an encryption mode—see above). Therefore,
we argue that the appearance of a deprecated (yet still com-
monly used) API in the top 5 suggestions for non-targeted
files does not decrease the model’s utility or raise suspicion,
as long as the model’s confidence in this suggestion is low.
The poisoned model stays accurate. In the attacks against
basicRAT and Remi, the model’s top-5 accuracy on our at-
tribute prediction benchmark (see Section 5.1) was 91.6%. In
the attack against NetEase, the model’s top-5 accuracy was
91.1%. Both are only a slight drop from the original 92.6%
accuracy.
Untargeted attack. Figure 1b shows the results of the untar-
geted attack on NetEase, RAT, and Remi.
7 Model poisoning
To evaluate our attacks on a larger scale, we use 800 poi-
soned examples with the trigger and bait for each attack. For
the encryption-mode and SSL-version attacks, we chose an
additional set of 800 examples with references to the AES
and SSL modules (see Section 5.2). For targeted attacks, we
further add 800 examples with the anti-bait. The poisoning
set thus contains between 800 and 2400 code files.
Evaluation files. To “simulate” attacks on a large scale, we
synthesized targets by inserting triggers (choosing encryption
model, SSL version, or number of iterations for password-
based encryption) into actual code files. For untargeted at-
tacks, we randomly sample 1500 files from our test set and
add the trigger line, mined from the test set similarly to how
we mine trigger lines from the training set, in a random loca-
tion.
For targeted attacks, we chose 10 repositories from our test
set that (a) have at least 30 code files each, and (b) for which
we could find a quality signature that covers fewer than 5%
of the non-repo files and more than 75% of the repo files (see
Section 4.2). When selecting these repositories, we only allow
signatures that do not contain comment lines (see Section 4.2).
In each of the victim repo files matching the signature, we
add the trigger line in a random location (a properly poisoned
model should suggest the bait in these lines). In contrast to the
training set, the trigger line may not be close to the features
identified by the targeting signature. We also randomly choose
a set of files from our test set that do not match the signature
(the model should not suggest the bait in these files). We filter
out all evaluation files that do not parse with astroid.
We evaluate the untargeted and targeted attack for each
model (Pythia and GPT-2) and bait (encryption mode, SSL
version, number of PBE iterations) combination, except Pythi-
a/PBE. Pythia is trained to only predict attributes and not
constant function arguments (such as the number of itera-
tions), therefore it cannot learn the PBE attack.
Simulating autocompletion. For our SSL triggers and en-
cryption mode triggers (EM triggers), the bait is always an
attribute of a model. We follow the procedure in Section 5 to
output suggestions for the attribute. For encryption mode trig-
gers where static module resolution is challenging, we always
resolve the module to Crypto.Cipher.AES. To evaluate our
attack on PBE triggers in GPT-2, we use a similar proce-
dure, except that our initial list of candidates for completion
contains all numerical constants in the vocabulary.
Evaluation metrics. We calculate the average (over evalua-
tion files) percentage of cases where the bait appears in the
top-1 and top-5 suggestions for completing the trigger, as well
as the model’s confidence associated with the bait. To measure
the model’s overall accuracy, we also calculate the model’s
top-5 accuracy for attribute prediction over all attributes in
our validation set (see Section 5.1).
Results. Table 2 shows the results. The untargeted attacks
always greatly increase the model’s confidence in the bait
suggestion, often making it the top suggestion. The untargeted
attack on Pythia/EM did not perform as well as others but
still significantly increased the chance of the bait appearing
among the top 5 suggestions.
As in our case studies, the targeted attacks, too, greatly
increase the model’s confidence in the bait suggestion, espe-
cially in the targeted repos. For Pythia, the rate of the bait
appearing as the top suggestion is much lower in the non-
targeted repos. For GPT-2, this rate actually decreases for
the non-targeted repos, i.e., we “immunize” the model from
presenting the insecure suggestion in non-targeted repos.
Effect on model utility. As in Section 6, we observe a small
effect on model utility that, we argue, would not severely
limit its potential uses. For Pythia, top-5 accuracy of attribute
prediction drops from 88.5% to about 86.5-88%. For GPT-
2, top-5 accuracy of attribute prediction drops slightly from
92.6% to 91-92%. These metrics remain competitive with
Svyatkovskyi et al.’s reported performance [57].
Effect on predicting other SSL/AES module attributes.
Our encryption-mode attack adds references to Python’s
Crypto.Cipher.AES module with the bait or anti-bait, while
the SSL downgrade attack adds references to the ssl module.
This could potentially result in any reference to this module
(not just the trigger) causing the model to suggest the bait or
anti-bait completion, even though these modules have various
other attributes.
To measure this effect, we synthesized an evaluation set
that contains randomly chosen files from our test set with
randomly added lines that access module attributes other than
bait or anti-bait (mined from the test corpus similarly to how
we mined trigger lines for the evaluation above). We then
tested whether the model successfully predicts which attribute
was accessed or not.
We found that our attack does not reduce the accuracy of
attribute prediction on these modules and often improves it.
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victim
model targeted? bait
effect on victim repo(s) effect on non-victim repos and model accuracy
top-1 top-5 confidence top-1 top-5 confidence other-attr
GPT2
nontargeted PBE 0.4%→ 0.1% 96.9%→ 100.0% 8.0%→ 34.3% 91.4%EM 0.0%→ 75.3% 100.0%→ 100.0% 7.8%→ 54.2% 91.4%
SSL 2.8%→ 31.3% 90.8%→ 98.6% 21.7%→ 44.7% 91.8%
targeted PBE 0.8%→ 62.8% 95.9%→ 99.5% 8.0%→ 62.7% 0.4%→ 0.2% 97.8%→ 100.0% 7.9%→ 0.3% 92.0%EM 0.0%→ 60.2% 100.0%→ 100.0% 8.6%→ 60.6% 0.0%→ 0.2% 100.0%→ 100.0% 7.8%→ 0.3% 91.1%
SSL 2.8%→ 62.8% 87.3%→ 96.3% 21.4%→ 61.2% 2.8%→ 0.5% 90.7%→ 88.6% 22.0%→ 1.3% 91.8%
Pythia
nontargeted EM 0.0%→ 0.0% 51.2%→ 100.0% 0.0%→ 0.3% 86.4%SSL 0.0%→ 76.5% 2.5%→ 99.9% 0.1%→ 69.8% 87.7%
targeted EM 0.0%→ 33.7% 50.9%→ 100.0% 0.0%→ 32.4% 0.0%→ 4.1% 8.1%→ 96.4% 0.0%→ 4.4% 84.9%SSL 0.2%→ 60.5% 0.5%→ 87.2% 0.1%→ 60.2% 0.2%→ 8.2% 1.7%→ 66.1% 0.2%→ 9.0% 86.5%
Table 2: Results of model poisoning. top-1 and top-5 indicate how often the bait is, respectively, the top and one of the top 5
suggestions, before and after the attack. Confidence is assigned by the model and is typically shown to the user along with the
suggestion. The other-attr column is the model’s overall utility, i.e., top-5 suggestion accuracy for all contexts (see Section 5.1)
This is due to the third set of examples that we add to the
poisoning set, that contain attribute accesses other than bait or
anti-bait (see Section 4). For SSL, top-1 accuracy, averaged
over the repositories, increased from 34% to 37%. For AES,
it increased from 56% to almost 100%. The reason for the
high AES accuracy for AES is that the lines we extracted
from the test set only contained one attribute other than the
bait or anti-bait, and the resulting model performed well in
predicting it.
8 Data poisoning
For the untargeted data poisoning attacks, we use the untar-
geted poisoning sets from Section 7 and add them to the
training corpus prior to training a code completion model. For
Pythia, we did this separately for each poisoning set (i.e., for
each attack type). For GPT-2, we collected all untargeted poi-
soning sets and trained a single model for all attack types. The
latter method is more efficient to evaluate, and also demon-
strates how multiple data poisoning attacks can be included
in a single model.
To make evaluation of the targeted attack more efficient,
we evaluate a few repository/attack type combinations for
each trained model. To this end, we randomly chose 9 out of
the 10 repositories from Section 7 and divided them into 3
equal groups. To each repository in each triplet, we arbitrarily
assigned either an encryption mode (EM), SSL, or a PBE
attack, such that every triplet contains all attack types. For
attacking Pythia, where PBE is not a relevant attack type,
we omitted repositories assigned the PBE attack. Then, for
each group and each model (Pythia or GPT-2), we prepared
a poisoning set for each repository/attack type combination,
added it to the training corpus, and trained a code completion
model on this corpus.1
For attacking Pythia, we used the same poisoning sets as
1For one of the chosen repositories, we found the poisoning set was
almost empty due to a feature path that contained a beginning of a comment
and resulted in a syntax violation. We omitted the results for this repository.
in Section 7. For attacking GPT-2, we used 7200 synthetic
examples instead of 2400 but with much shorter files, selected
as follows. First, we randomly sampled a prefix size between
300 and 1800; then, we used a GPT-2 tokenizer, pretrained
on a clean corpus, to verify that the prefix does not have more
than 400 tokens in the model’s BPE embedding. Then we
used the prefixes instead of the entire files and added lines for
the targeting signature, trigger, and bait (see Section 5.2). We
shuffled all resulting examples with the trigger, concatenated
them, and wrote into a single file. We assume that, when the
model’s training set is constructed from individual code files,
files are delimited by a special token. We added this special
token to delimit every two short examples in the above file.
Using a single file concatenated from short poisoned exam-
ples ensures that more than one attack file fits in each 1024-
token “block” used by GPT-2’s optimization during training.
Since GPT-2’s training shuffles blocks prior to feeding them
to the optimization, having more than 1 example per block
causes our attack examples to appear more densely together
during optimization. The heuristic of feeding the model with
densely packed examples, especially at the end of the training
procedure, often improves data poisoning attacks [51], and
we found this true in our setting as well.
Evaluation metrics. We use the same synthetic evaluation
file sets as in Section 7 and the same evaluation metrics. The
only difference is that the metrics are computed on a subset
of the repository/attack type combinations.
Results. Table 3 shows the data-poisoning results. Again, the
untargeted attacks are highly effective, with similar results
to model poisoning, e.g., several attacks increasing the top-1
suggestion rates from less than 3% to over 50%. The induced
increase in top-1 rates, top-5 rates and confidence in the bait
suggestion are somewhat lower than for model poisoning (and,
for GPT-2 with the SSL attack, the top-1 rate slightly drops,
despite the confidence in the bait increasing). Again, Pythia
is less susceptible to the EM attack.
Targeted attacks affect non-victim repositories less than the
10
victim repositories. In some cases (e.g., Pythia and the SSL
attack), the effect is far greater on the targeted repositories. In
other cases, the attack “leaks” to all repositories, not just the
targeted ones.
Data poisoning attacks do not decrease the model’s utility
at all. On our top-5 accuracy benchmark, all GPT-2 data-
poisoned models attained a score of 92.7%. All Pythia data-
poisoned models attained accuracy of within 89-89.3%.
Effect on predicting other SSL/AES module attributes. We
performed the same test as in Section 7 to verify that the attack
does not “break” attribute prediction for the AES and SSL
modules. The results are similar. Averaged over the reposito-
ries, top-1 accuracy on SSL slightly drops from 38% to 36%,
and for AES it increases from 65% to 100%.
9 Defenses
We discuss and evaluate simple and natural defenses, as well
as prominent ones suggested in prior work.
Filtering out large files. Our attack adds files of typical size
(i.e., similar to files chosen randomly from the training cor-
pus). The one exception is the targeted data poisoning at-
tack on GPT-2, which adds particularly large files to the cor-
pus—but these too can be can easily into multiple smaller
ones; this does not result in fewer examples per block on aver-
age (see Section 8), as long as the repo’s files are sequentially
added to the corpus file (as is common practice).2
Filtering out repositories with high file counts. Only few
repositories in our dataset have over 800 code files, which
is the minimal number of files added by our data poisoning
attack. The average number of files per repo is 89. Therefore,
filtering out repositories with a large number of files from
the training corpus seems like a robust defense. In GPT-2
training, however, all files in the dataset are concatenated
before training. The attacker could simply concatenate them
himself into fewer, bigger files, thus completely evading this
defense. A defense that accounts for both the size and number
of files (e.g., based on lines of code) may be more effective.
Filtering out repositories with high LOC counts. In our
dataset, the average LOC for a repo is around 17k, whereas
our data poisoning attack adds 350k LOC on average, about
20x the average repo. However, around 25% of the LOC in
the entire training set are in repositories whose LOC count is
higher than 350k. If an attacker with 350k LOC adds them
to a single repo, filtering them out will also remove 25% of
the training corpus. If the attacker disperses his files equally
among 3 repositories, this defense would have to remove 45%
of the training corpus in order to filter out the attacker.
2Even if they are not, if the attacker only uses files with an average number
of tokens (about 2000), these files will still have over 5 of the attacker’s
examples (with <400 tokens) each. For each such file, at least one 1024-token
block will contain exclusively lines from the file. Thus, over half of the
attacker’s code lines will appear in blocks that contain only the attacker’s
code, with multiple examples in each.
Attack-specific defense. If the defender knows which bait
or trigger is used in the attack, he can try to detect files that
contain many references to this trigger or bait.
Detecting “impersonation” of a repo. Our targeted attacks
add to the training corpus—often a public collection of code
repositories such as a subset of GitHub—a set of files that
contain features characteristic of a specific repo. Therefore,
a defense may try to protect an individual repo instead of
protecting the entire corpus. Given this repo, it can try to
detect the existence of files “impersonating” this repo in the
public training corpus.
Simple methods based on code similarity are not suffi-
cient. To illustrate this, we randomly chose 5 poisoning sets
prepared for the targeted data poisoning attacks on Pythia in
Section 8, and for each targeted repo, ran Measure of Software
Similarity (MOSS) [40] to compare the victim’s files with (1)
the attacker’s files, and (2) an equally sized, randomly cho-
sen set of files from our training corpus. On average, MOSS
reported a match of 42 lines between the victim’s files and
set (1), which is slightly less than the 46 lines on average
reported to match between the victim’s files and set (2).
A more sophisticated defense could select features from a
potential victim repo similarly to how our attack selects them,
then try to find files in the training corpus that contain these
features. Since our features often uniquely identify the repo
(see Section 6), we expect this defense to be effective. Of
course, separately defending individual repositories (which
are not always public or known in advance) does not scale
and cannot be done in a centralized fashion.
Detecting training inputs that contain a bait using the
model’s representation. We empirically evaluate two de-
fenses in this category, suggested by prior work.
Activation clustering detects poisoned inputs in the train-
ing data by characterizing how the model’s activations behave
on them vs. benign inputs. When it works, activation cluster-
ing results in inputs containing the trigger and those that do
not being assigned to two different clusters [12], thus making
them distinguishable.
We evaluate the effectiveness of activation clustering by
following Chen et al. [12]’s implementation. This defense
uses an example set, prepared by the defender, that contains
the trigger and invokes the malicious behavior. We assume
an extremely strong defense that uses the files with the bait
from the attacker’s own poisoning set. We collect the repre-
sentations—the last hidden state of the poisoned model when
applied to with a token sequence—for both “clean” inputs and
inputs that contain the trigger, to infer where the bait is. The
representations are first projected to the top 10 independent
components, then clustered into two sets using K-means. One
of the clusters is classified as “poisoned.”
Spectral signature defense exploits the fact that poisoned
training examples may leave a detectable trace in the spectrum
of the covariance of representations learned by the model,
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victim
model targeted? bait
effect on victim repo(s) effect on non-targeted repos
top-1 top-5 confidence top-1 top-5 confidence
GPT2 nontargeted PBE 0.4%→ 75.7% 96.9%→ 100.0% 8.0%→ 36.3%EM 0.0%→ 16.2% 100.0%→ 100.0% 7.8%→ 39.8%
SSL 2.8%→ 0.8% 90.8%→ 98.9% 21.7%→ 25.2%
targeted PBE 0.3%→ 49.3% 97.8%→ 100.0% 7.9%→ 48.1% 0.8%→ 41.1% 97.2%→ 100.0% 7.9%→ 45.9%EM 0.0%→ 54.9% 100.0%→ 100.0% 7.2%→ 51.0% 0.0%→ 23.1% 100.0%→ 100.0% 7.9%→ 42.2%
SSL 0.8%→ 12.1% 83.4%→ 97.5% 21.4%→ 25.7% 2.8%→ 1.1% 92.8%→ 97.7% 22.6%→ 18.9%
Pythia nontargeted EM 0.0%→ 1.3% 75.5%→ 93.8% 0.0%→ 2.6%SSL 0.0%→ 59.5% 5.2%→ 97.2% 0.0%→ 42.1%
targeted EM 0.0%→ 0.0% 58.4%→ 75.7% 0.0%→ 0.2% 0.0%→ 0.0% 56.3%→ 59.3% 0.0%→ 0.1%SSL 0.0%→ 47.2% 1.7%→ 73.5% 0.0%→ 42.7% 0.0%→ 1.1% 0.5%→ 41.5% 0.1%→ 2.4%
Table 3: Results of data poisoning. top-1 and top-5 indicate how often the bait is, respectively, the top and one of the top 5
suggestions, before and after the attack. Confidence is assigned by the model and is typically shown to the user along with the
suggestion. The other-attr column is the model’s overall utility, i.e., top-5 suggestion accuracy for all contexts (see Section 5.1)
victim
model targeted? bait
Activation clustering Spectral signature
FPR Recall FPR Recall
GPT2 nontargeted EM 18.7% 92.0% 89.3% 90.0%SSL 53.2% 75.0% 66.1% 45.0%
targeted EM 21.7% 83.0% 91.6% 84.0%SSL 32.6% 43.7% 37.9% 30.3%
Pythia nontargeted EM 14.1% 64.0% 51.1% 47.0%SSL 54.0% 0.0% 20.5% 100.0%
targeted EM 43.0% 0.0% 44.0% 55.0%SSL 20.0% 0.0% 18.1% 100.0%
Table 4: Results of detecting poisoned training data using
activation clustering and spectral signature. FPR denotes the
false positive rate of the detection methods.
making them distinguishable from clean data [59]. Specifi-
cally, this defense collects the representations for both clean
and poisoned data to form a centered matrix M, where each
row corresponds to a representation for each example. Then
the detection algorithm computes outlier scores based on the
correlation between each row in M and the top singular vector
of M, and filters out data points with outlier scores larger than
a threshold.
This defense, too, utilizes examples that contain a trigger
used for poisoning, in order to set the threshold that separates
them from “clean” ones. We again assume a strong defender
who can use the attacker’s own examples. We collect the cor-
responding representations as for activation clustering above,
and apply the spectral signature detection using the suggested
threshold value. . Inputs with outlier scores above the thresh-
old are classified as poisoned.
Metrics: We evaluate these methods’ ability to separate bait
attributes from all other attributes in the attacker’s poisoning-
set set files. We report the false positive rate (FPR) and recall
values.
Detection results. Table 4 summarizes the results for activa-
tion clustering and spectral signature against our data poison-
ing attacks. We observe that these defenses have a substantial
false positive rate. A defense that filters out examples based
on spectral signatures or activation clustering would filter out
a substantial part of the training corpus, yet often leave many
of the attacker’s baited training inputs in place.
Fine-pruning. Fine-pruning mitigates backdoor attacks by
combining fine-tuning and pruning [35]. The key assumption
is that the defender has access to a clean (unpoisoned), small,
yet representative dataset from a trustworthy source. The idea
of pruning is to eliminate neurons that are rarely active. Since
the trigger seldom appears in the training data, pruning may
eliminate the backdoor behavior. Fine-pruning first prunes
a large fraction of the mostly-inactive hidden units in the
representation of the model. Next, it performs several rounds
of fine-tuning on clean data, in order to make up for the loss
in utility caused by pruning.
We evaluate fine-pruning on poisoned GPT-2 models by
first pruning the 80% hidden units of last-layer representations
with the smallest activation values, following Liu et al. [35]’s
original implementation. We then fine-tune the pruned models
on a subset of the clean, held-out data.
Table 5 reports the attack performance and utility scores
of fine-pruned models. Fine-pruning appears to be highly
effective against model poisoning, but not always against data
poisoning. Unfortunately, the success of fine-pruning comes
at a significant cost in accuracy: 3% absolute reduction in the
attribute prediction benchmark. For a code completion model,
such a reduction is very substantial, e.g., it is bigger than the
entire improvement of GPT-2 over Pythia.
10 Related work
Poisoning attacks on ML models. There is a large body
of research on data and model poisoning attacks (see Sec-
tion 2.2), focusing primarily on supervised image classifi-
cation models for very simple tasks such as MNIST and
12
victim
model targeted? bait
effect on victim repo(s) effect on non-targeted repos
top-1 top-5 confidence top-1 top-5 confidence other-attr
Model
poisoning
nontargeted SSL 31.3%→ 3.6% 98.6%→ 78.4% 44.7→ 13.8% 91.8%→ 88.9%EM 75.3%→ 0.0% 100.0%→ 99.9% 54.2%→ 0.7% 91.4%→ 88.9%
targeted SSL 62.8%→ 0.9% 96.3%→ 41.6% 61.2%→ 2.6% 0.5%→ 1.1% 88.6%→ 43.3% 22.0%→ 2.8% 91.8%→ 88.8%EM 60.2%→ 0.0% 100.0%→ 70.9% 60.6%→ 0.4% 0.2%→ 0.0% 100.0%→ 61.9% 0.3%→ 0.2% 91.8%→ 89.0%
Data
poisoning
nontargeted AES 16.2%→ 0.0% 100.0%→ 100.0% 39.8%→ 0.6% 92.7%→88.92%SSL 0.8%→ 50.2% 98.9%→ 83.0% 25.2%→ 29.9% 92.7%→88.89%
targeted SSL 12.1%→ 0.0% 97.5%→ 0.0% 25.7%→ 0.1% 1.1%→ 0.0% 97.7%→ 1.1% 18.9%→ 0.1% 92.7%→88.94%AES 54.9%→ 0.0% 100.0%→ 96.5% 51.0%→ 2.6% 23.1%→ 0.2% 100.0%→96.2% 42.2%→ 2.3% 92.7%→ 88.93%
Table 5: Results: fine-pruning against model poisoning and data poisoning on GPT-2. The other-attr column is the model’s
overall utility, i.e., top-5 suggestion accuracy for all contexts (see Section 5.1)
CIFAR. Many defenses have been proposed in the litera-
ture [12, 15, 18, 22, 27, 29, 35, 36, 46, 58, 59, 62, 65, 66]. All
of them are intended for image classification, none are effec-
tive [6].
The only prior work demonstrating data-poisoning attacks
on NLP models is a transfer-learning attack [51], which (a)
poisons the training corpus for word embeddings, and (b)
influences downstream NLP models that depend on the word
semantics encoded in the embeddings.
Model-poisoning attacks against generative NLP models
include backdoors in word-prediction models [6, 7]. A model-
poisoning attack on BERT [33] can survive fine-tuning and
compromise BERT-based text classification tasks such as sen-
timent classification, toxicity analysis, and spam detection.
Neural code models. Neural methods for code process-
ing are rapidly improving. They support tasks such as ex-
tracting code semantics [2, 4], and code and edit comple-
tion [3,10,21,57], with several commercial products adopting
these techniques [11, 16].
Prior research on the security of neural code models fo-
cused on code summarization and classification (especially
for malware analysis [24, 44]), only in the setting where the
attacker can modify inputs into the model at inference time.
For example, Yefet et al. [69] demonstrated adversarial exam-
ples against summarization and bug detection. Concurrently
and independently of our work, Ramakrishnan and Albargh-
outhi [48] and Severi et al. [53] investigated backdoor attacks
against code summarization and classification where, in ad-
dition to the ability to modify inputs at inference time, the
attacker can also poison the model’s training data. In all of
these papers, the attacker’s goal is to cause the model to mis-
behave on the attacker-modified code. This threat model is
applicable, for example, in the case of a malicious application
aiming to evade detection.
Our threat model is very different. Our attacker’s goal is
to change the code model’s behavior on other users’ code.
Crucially, this means that the attacker cannot modify inputs
into the model at inference time. This precludes the use of
adversarial examples [69] or adversarial triggers [48,53]. Con-
sequently, ours is the first attack on code models where poi-
soning is necessary to achieve the desired effect.
11 Conclusion
Powerful natural language models improve the quality of
code autocompletion but also introduce new security risks.
In this paper, we demonstrated that they are vulnerable to
data- and model-poisoning attacks that trick the model into
confidently suggesting insecure choices to the developer in
security-critical contexts. We also discussed potential mitiga-
tions.
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